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ABSTRACT
The current state of digital forensic investigation is continuously challenged by the rapid
technological changes, the increase in the use of digital devices (both the heterogeneity and
the count), and the sheer volume of data that these devices could contain. Although data
privacy protection is not a performance measure, however, preventing privacy violations
during the digital forensic investigation, is also a big challenge. With a perception that the
completeness of investigation and the data privacy preservation are incompatible with each
other, the researchers have provided solutions to address the above-stated challenges that
either focus on the effectiveness of the investigation process or the data privacy preservation. However, a comprehensive approach that preserves data privacy without affecting the
capabilities of the investigator or the overall efficiency of the investigation process is still an
open problem. In the current work, the authors have proposed a digital forensic framework
that uses case information, case profile data and expert knowledge for automation of the
digital forensic analysis process; utilizes machine learning for finding most relevant pieces of
evidence; and maintains data privacy of non-evidential private files. All these operations are
coordinated in a way that the overall efficiency of the digital forensic investigation process
increases while the integrity and admissibility of the evidence remain intact. The framework
improves validation which boosts transparency in the investigation process. The framework
also achieves a higher level of accountability by securely logging the investigation steps. As
the proposed solution introduces notable enhancements to the current investigative practices more like the next version of Digital Forensics, the authors have named the framework
‘Digital Forensics 2.0’, or ‘DF 2.0’ in short.
Keywords: Digital Forensics Framework, Automation, Data Privacy, Machine Learning
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INTRODUCTION

Digital forensic science has evolved a lot
since the first Digital Forensics Research
Workshop (Palmer et al., 2001). However,
there have been some research problems that
are continuously challenging the researchers
and practitioners till date.
The first and foremost challenge is the ever
growing data storage capacity of digital devices (Quick & Choo, 2014). The large volume of data increases the time requirements
for the data acquisition and the data analysis processes (Lillis, Becker, O’Sullivan, &
Scanlon, 2016). Moreover, since the number of cases that involve digital evidence in
some form is on the rise all over the world,
the digital forensic investigators are facing a
pressing need for reducing the investigation
time per case (Al Awadhi, Read, Marrington, & Franqueira, 2015).
The second challenge is thrown by the increasing diversity of digital devices that are
becoming available in the market (Hossain,
Fotouhi, & Hasan, 2015). Digital forensic personnel have to continuously strive for
finding new ways (through software as well
as hardware means) to acquire and analyze such devices (Inspectorate, 2015). The
software diversity deals with variety of filetypes, ever evolving Operating Systems, the
huge pool of innovative applications, and
other software advancements aimed at contemporary digital devices. On the hardware
front, diversity of sensors, chips, circuit modules and other hardware units that produce
unique data streams presents a challenge for
digital forensics. Although providing a soThe current work is an extension of the
paper which was presented at “The ADFSL
2018 Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law ” on May 17, 2018 at the University of Texas at San Antonio, TX, USA.
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lution to each instance of the above-stated
diversity challenges is a one-time effort for
the practitioners and researchers; however,
overall the rate at which these parameters
change keeps them on their toes.
Furthermore, people tend to use separate
devices for communication, entertainment
and productivity purposes. Hence the number of individuals who own and use more
than one digital devices at a time is increasing (Facebook-Business, 2014). Another study by Facebook in 2016 reveals that
94% teens in France and 98% teens in Germany own multiple devices (Facebook-IQ,
2016). The Pew Research Center published a
report in 2015 stating that around 36% of US
adults own all three devices, namely a smartphone, a computer, and a tablet (Anderson,
2015). Another survey by Pew in January
2017 has revealed that 77% of US adult
population owns a smartphone, 78% owns
a desktop or laptop, and 51% owns a tablet
computer (Pew-Research, 2017). Although
the survey presents separate figures for the
three devices, one can safely assume that
individuals who own multiple devices are a
significant part of the US population today.
The people in other regions of the world either share similar statistics or would achieve
the same trends in the near future. The rise
in the number of devices owned per person
would increase the average number of exhibits seized in a new case, thus increasing
the respective investigation time and efforts.
Even after finding their ways to acquire
and analyze the new digital devices, the digital forensic examiners face the third challenge from rapid technological advancements
that change the rules of the game now and
then (Garfinkel, 2010). The technological
progress that poses a challenge to investigators is the increasing list of devices that
are going digital every day, thanks to the
novel hardware innovations. The devices in
everyday use which get equipped with comc 2019 ADFSL
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putational, communication and digital storage capability, commonly referred to as Internet of Things (IoT), pose new investigative challenges to the digital forensic process (Oriwoh, Jazani, Epiphaniou, & Sant,
2013). Any investigation involving such devices would require knowledge about how the
data is produced, stored and communicated
to or from these devices.
The fourth challenge, which is not directly
connected to the functioning of the digital
forensic investigation, is data privacy protection during the digital forensic investigation (Aminnezhad, Dehghantanha, & Abdullah, 2012). The Digital forensic investigators always get full access to the contents of seized storage media which according to them is necessary for achieving completeness. Apart from containing potential
evidence files, the seized storage media also
contain owner’s private data which may be
sensitive at times like private/family pictures
and videos, business related digital documents, medical diagnostic or treatment reports, commercial software with license information, and much more. Investigator’s
open access to these private files is a threat
to owner’s data privacy (Verma, Govindaraj,
& Gupta, 2016).
The data privacy protection is also related to need for transparency in the digital
forensic investigation that ensures only caserelevant data are accessed from the seized
media and remaining private files are not
affected (Dehghantanha & Franke, 2014).
There is a pressing need for finding means
to fix accountability of the investigator in
case a data privacy breach happens during
the investigation. The two sister agencies
that work in close collaboration with digital
forensic personnel, namely the Police and the
regular forensic laboratories, are facing difficulties related to transparency and accountability. The case of Annie Dookhan is a good
example of the same (Driscoll, 2014). To the
c 2019 ADFSL
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best of authors’ knowledge, there are no reported instances of professional misconduct
against digital forensic investigators till date;
however, it is high time that the community
should adopt self-regulatory ways to improve
the transparency as well as the accountability of the digital investigation process.
Apart from the challenges listed above,
some researchers have predicted that moving forward the field of digital forensic
would start diverging into more specialized sub-fields (Garfinkel, 2015). The subfields would require the investigators to possess expert knowledge of the respective subdomain. The digital forensic laboratories
would need an investigation mechanism that
could allow different experts to work together on a given case. There is one more
aspect to learning for digital forensic examiners which aims to capture the psychological, cultural and social characteristics of
the people who commit computer related
crimes (M. K. Rogers, 2011). Researchers
have been trying to capture such parameters
that could help in digital forensics investigation process (M. Rogers, 1999; M. K. Rogers,
Seigfried, & Tidke, 2006).
The digital forensic frameworks to date
have focused on addressing the above-stated
challenges either in separation or welldefined scenarios with controlled environmental conditions. In the current work,
the authors have proposed a new digital
forensic framework that incorporates forensic image preprocessing, tool-independent
automation, machine learning based filtration of most relevant evidence and their privacy level evaluation to address the abovestated challenges. The framework proposes
a new way in which the state of the art digital forensic research and systems could be
combined in one place to realize the following.
• Increased investigative efficiency by rePage 15
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ducing the investigation time and efforts
• Improved investigative accuracy by using multiple tools at the same time
• Better investigative planning via automation
• Improved validation
• Data privacy protection for forensically
non-relevant private files
• Enhanced transparency and accountability
• Building expert knowledge for forensic
investigation, education, training, and
multi-agency collaborations

2.

PROPOSED
SOLUTION

The framework takes forensic exhibits and
images (of desktops, laptops, smartphones,
tablets, or other devices that store data),
network logs, memory dumps, and all other
sources of digital storage as input (refer to
figure 1). As the inputs proceed to the next
phase of ‘Forensic Preprocessing’, the
investigator fills in all case related facts into
a document called Current Case Information (CCI). The document consists of forensically relevant data that is unique to the
case under investigation, like individual keywords, timelines, and other useful information. After that, the investigator also provides the list of digital forensic tools, with
their respective version numbers. All input
images are processed to remove forensically
irrelevant data like files listed in NSRL (Seo,
Lim, Choi, Chang, & Lee, 2009) and duplicate files (Neuner, Mulazzani, Schrittwieser,
& Weippl, 2015; Scanlon, 2016). The forensic image formatting is also changed, without breaking the integrity of the input, to
Page 16

enable fast and parallel operations in successive investigation phases. In case physical devices (exhibits) are available, then the
imaging for these seized devices is started
simultaneously with the data removal and
reformatting. The authors call the above
procedure ‘forensic preprocessing’ as it precedes the actual processing for finding evidence files (the analysis phase). The preprocessing aims to rearrange and consolidate the
data available in all of the submitted forensic images (provided in any of the popular
formats) so that forensic tools could read
the data concurrently. However, all preprocessing techniques and methods should ensure that the output produced by them is
compatible with all digital forensic software
tools. The section 3 discusses preprocessing
in details.
The next step runs the ‘Automated
Digital Forensic Processing’ module.
The module takes inputs from the CCI
document, a case-specific command list,
and some already known exception commands.
The ‘Case Profile Commands
(CPC)’ database contains a list of commands that a specific digital forensic tool
would require while performing a case specific job under a particular hardware deployment. These commands listed in CPCdatabase ensure that the planning of investigative steps is complete and consistent
with respect to a particular type of case. For
example, in the case of a financial fraud investigation, the CPC-database will contain
commands for say Encase tool, version 7.0
running on a Windows 8.1 workstation, to
perform a keyword search job (with a list of
unique operations, called job-sections, refer
figure 2) on a Linux machine’s forensic-image
that has an EXT4 file-system. The CPCdatabase contains the comprehensive collection of commands and scripts, to complete
distinct tasks, which are executed by the list
of forensic software tools already provided by
c 2019 ADFSL
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Secure Logging

Add exhibits
and/or
forensic images

Forensic preprocessing

Case Profile
Commands (CPC)

Automated digital forensic
processing

Exception
Commands (EC)

All forensically relevant evidence
are obtained

Evidence Features
(EF)

Relevance vs. Privacy Quotient

Privacy Features (PF)

p2i3 Module

Most relevant evidence identified;
Ranked and marked using ML

Top n ranked evidence are
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Investigator analyzes the
evidence
Yes
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Show next n
evidence

No

Refine
automation
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Investigation goals are
achieved

Generate the investigation report
+
Mark the final evidence files for
training ML algorithms.

Stop

Figure 1. Digital Forensic 2.0 framework flowchart
the investigator.
The Exception Commands (EC) database
consists of command structure similar to
that of the CPC-database with a distinction
c 2019 ADFSL

that these commands aim to find evidence
files that could otherwise be missed during
the initial run of forensic tools. For example, all PDF attachments received on Gmail
Page 17

JDFSL V14N2

DF 2.0: An automated, privacy preserving, and efficient DF framework

while being viewed by the receiver’s browser
generates one PNG image for each page
of the attached document (Verma, Gupta,
Sarkar, & Gupta, 2012). So, when the
user login into their account and check their
emails with PDF files as attachments, the
PNG images corresponding to each page of
the viewed PDF document get loaded into
the browser cache. These images could be
extracted from any of these three sources;
the cache on hard-disk drive, the RAM dump
or the Hibernation file of the system. A digital forensic investigator should fill in command (or scripts) to parse these PNG files,
from the sources described above, in the ECdatabase.
The EC-database is a collection of all such
exclusive commands which can find targeted
content. In other words, the database contains expert knowledge which has been acquired over time from individual experience,
careful observations, and novel research efforts. In case two forensic labs enjoy a
considerable amount of trust and mutual
understanding, they could share their ECdatabases. The sharing will give the examiners on both sides the opportunity to upgrade
their knowledge and enhance their capabilities. In case all forensic labs in a province
or state agree to share their EC-databases,
it could become a good collection of valuable
regional (demographic) forensic insights.
Depending on the investigation needs and
the availability of forensic tools, the automation module can work with both the open
source as well as commercial digital forensic tools. The framework requires that the
forensically relevant files processed by the
tools have a uniformly high level of data abstraction. For example, the tools should expands all compound files (at a lower level of
data abstraction) to extract the contained
files (at a higher level of data abstraction)
before these files could be passed on to the
next level of scrutiny by the framework. SecPage 18

tion 4 discusses this in more details.
The results of Automated Digital Forensic Processing are passed on to the next
step (Relevance vs. Privacy Quotient).
Here, with the help of machine learning algorithms, a relevance score for all potential
evidence files (obtained from the automation
module) is calculated. Similarly, the privacy
quotient for these files is also calculated simultaneously. The investigator is then presented with a finite list of the top scoring
relevant files. The investigator can analyze
these files to decide whether these evidence
files are sufficient to prove or disprove the
case. If the investigator wants, she could
keep on requesting the next lot of most relevant files for further examination, till the
list of potential evidence gets exhausted. As
soon as the investigator gets sufficient evidence from the relevance list, she may stop
the investigation and generate the case report. However, if the investigator feels that
the artifacts enlisted in relevance list are not
sufficient, she is free to override the filters
and start over the automation module.
The framework also incorporates a Secure Logging System (from start of the
investigation till it stops) where all actions
and decisions of the investigator are chronologically logged into a secure place. The
safe storage for these logs could either be
a hardened local server or a reliable cloud
space where the investigator has no chance of
tampering with them (Barik, Gupta, Sinha,
Mishra, & Mazumdar, 2007; Verma, Govindaraj, & Gupta, 2014). Since the investigator may be required to explain her actions in
case any privacy breach or some foul play is
either doubted or reported. The secure logging ensures that the accountability of the
investigator is fixed when such a situation
arises. A brief discussion on the same is presented in section 7.
Automation used in the framework simplifies repeatability of the investigation process,
c 2019 ADFSL
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which proves to be very helpful in validating
the investigation outcomes. Especially, for
the Technical Validation which aims to
check whether all steps followed by the investigator fulfill the goals of the investigation.
Automation together with the secure-logging
will help the digital forensic community to
study and optimize the investigative techniques followed by examiners. Repeatability
and easy validation could improve the overall transparency of the investigative process.
The framework also ensures a three-way error reduction mechanism using automation.
Firstly, the automation reduces the chances
of human error that may happen at any time.
Secondly, the automation ensures that no
step is missed from the investigative planning which remains consistent for a particular type of case. Thirdly, the automation
ensures that no evidence file is missed due
to limitations of a particular tool since results from different forensic tools are combined to present a comprehensive list of potential pieces of evidence. The above solution will keep the investigative powers of the
investigator intact with good chances that
her overall efficiency gets improved.

2.1

Setup

The proposed framework needs a hardware
infrastructure that could provide both highperformance computational power as well as
high-speed data storage and access. A robust and capable software should also support the hardware to realize both an efficient
parallel processing and a powerful data management mechanism. Another requirement
for the software component of the framework
is its compatibility to run applications and
programs from all publicly available software
platforms. So, all state of the art Operating System dependent and Operating System independent digital forensic tools, which
are capable of working on various digital devices, irrespective of whether they are closed
c 2019 ADFSL
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source (commercial) or open source could be
deployed on the proposed framework.
All the forensic tools and applications that
are installed on the framework should be
able to receive command-line instructions.
Since most of the open source digital forensic tools take command-line inputs, they can
easily be attached to the framework. Since
all commercial tools are closed source, it is
the responsibility of their developers to provide a command-line support for their respective tools. Although there are some
tools like EnCase, which accept scripts to
automate some investigative tasks, there is
still a segment of commercial tools that do
not support automation. The tools that do
not provide any support for automation can
not be used with the proposed framework.
Depending on the requirement, the proposed framework can be set up on any of
the following configurations:
1. Beowulf Cluster in a laboratory- best
suited for digital forensic laboratory environments where a suitable number
of processing nodes could be selected
based on the budget and investigative
load (Ayers, 2009). A Beowulf cluster
file system provides support for highperformance data access and storage.
The processing speed and efficiency of a
Beowulf cluster in a laboratory setting
are better as compared to a distributed
systems deployment or a cloud deployment of the same configuration.
2. On the Cloud - a private cloud with
a strict access control could be a useful option for an investigation agency,
which has multiple departments located
at same or different geographical locations (Van Baar, van Beek, & van Eijk,
2014). Alternatively, an agency could
also rent virtual machines on a public
cloud having comparatively high processing and data storage capabilities.
Page 19
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The catch with cloud-based deployment
is the dependency on limited upload and
download speeds. However, if the network speeds are favorable, the cloudhosted framework could enhance remote
investigations capabilities where investigators could simultaneously work on the
same case.
3. Distributed Systems - could also be
used to deploy the framework with the
processing power comparable to abovementioned deployment models. However, the data access speed, the parallelization in processing, and the file
system capabilities would be relatively
more complicated and hard to manage (Richard III & Roussev, 2006).

3.

PREPROCESSING

The Forensic Preprocessing module is the
first component of the proposed framework
that operates on the forensic images. The
authors call the module ‘forensic preprocessing’ as it precedes the process of finding evidence files (the analysis phase). The preprocessing aims to rearrange and consolidate the
data available in all of the submitted forensic images so that forensic tools could read
the data concurrently.
Before preprocessing could begin, the investigator is required to fill in all case related details into the Current Case Information (CCI) document. The document
consists of forensically relevant information
about the case under investigation, like the
type of case, the name of the case, suspect’s
information, keywords of interest, timelines
of interest, targeted file types, and other
valuable information(refer figure 2). After
filling the CCI document, the investigator
also provides the list of digital forensic tools,
with their respective version numbers, which
are installed on her forensic system and best
Page 20

suit the analysis requirements of the given
case. The information from the CCI document and the tools list is used by the preprocessing module to fine-tune its operations.
The primary aim of the preprocessing
module is to change the data formatting of
the forensic images (without breaking their
integrity) so that the digital forensic tools
attached to the framework could perform
highly efficient parallelized operations. The
secondary aim is to remove forensically irrelevant data from the forensic images which
include files listed in NSRL (Seo et al., 2009)
and duplicate files (Neuner et al., 2015;
Scanlon, 2016).
In case physical devices (exhibits) are submitted instead of their forensic images, then
the imaging for these seized devices is started
simultaneously with the data reformatting
and redundancy removal. All preprocessing
techniques and methods should ensure that
the output produced by them is compatible
with the digital forensic software tools due
to be used in the automation phase.
The data formatting operation should
keep the integrity of the forensic images intact, and hence there should be no impact
on the admissibility of the forensic evidence
extracted out of the newly formatted data.

4.

AUTOMATION

The Automated Digital Forensic Processing module aims to carry out a thorough
forensic analysis of the forensic images to
collect all case related potential pieces of
evidence without any human intervention.
The module uses the Current Case Information (CCI) document and queries both
the Case Profile Commands (CPC) database
as well as the Exception Commands (EC)
database (refer figure 3).
The CPC-database is populated by querying two tables, namely the Job-Sections table and the Tool-Selection table (positioned
c 2019 ADFSL
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Job-Sections Table
Fills in Current Case
Information (CCI)

Case Type

Chooses Jobs and
Job-Sections

Case type

Job type

Keyword
search
Password
Fin_Fraud
search
Keyword
Mal_Attack
search
Fin_Fraud

Jobs

Provides Tool Names and
Respective Versions

Job Section

…

1, 3, 4, 5, 6, .., N

…

3, 5,6,7, …, L

…

1, 2, 5, 7, 9, …, K

…

Tool-Selection Table
Tool
Name

Tool
Version

EnCase

7.1

EnCase

7.1

EnCase

7.1

Job type
Keyword
search
Keyword
search
Keyword
search

Job
Section
1
3
4

Host
OS
Win 10
64b
Win 10
64b
Win 10
64b

Host
Image
Image
Image
Storage
Cmd
File
Source
Source
format
technology
System
OS
Filesystem

Options/
Parameters

…

NTFS

E01

Linux

Ext4

HDD

cmd1

-p -v

…

NTFS

E01

Linux

Ext4

HDD

cmd3

-p -t

…

NTFS

E01

Linux

Ext4

HDD

cmd1

-u -n

…

Figure 2. Investigator’s input to the framework
at top right and bottom of figure 2 respectively). The Job-Sections table contains information about various jobs and sub-jobs
(the author calls them job-sections) that
are carried out by the digital forensic tools.
The job name specifies a particular task of
forensic importance which is used in a digital
investigation, for example ‘keyword search’.
The keyword search can further be divided
into small tasks, like searching keywords in
all text files (let us call it job-section 1). Similarly, searching for keywords in PDF files is
another sub-task (let us call it job-section 2).
Likewise, a comprehensive list of well-defined
subtasks for a particular job can be populated. If we consider the keyword search job
with reference to a particular case (say Financial Fraud), the investigator can identify
the list of job-sections that are useful for the
investigation of that case.
The Job-Sections table contains this mapping for all type of known case types, respective jobs that are needed to be performed for
these case types and the comprehensive list
c 2019 ADFSL

of job-sections for the same.
The Tool-Selection table contains tool version specific commands or scripts to implement job-sections from the Job-Sections table. All of the instructions are stored with
respective parameters.
The CPC-database is populated with
case-specific commands recognized by the
tools, specified by the investigator, for completing a collection of small investigative
jobs. The values obtained from the CCI
document include specific terms including
names of the suspects, names of the companies they are associated with, names of their
partners, names of the projects they have
handled, and more.
The CPC-database holds all job specific
directives that may belong to more than one
type of case profiles; for example, keyword
search is one job which has application in
a variety of cases. The keyword search job
can be performed by various digital forensic software tools. However, the search technique implementation along with the keyPage 21
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Case Type
Case Name
Suspect list
Questioned
media
Keywords of
interest
Timeline of
interest
File types of
interest
…
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Fin_Fraud
Case_xyz
SP_1, SP_2, …
HDD, PenDrive,
Smartphone …
Company_name,
Partners, Projects…
Start_time, End_time
Documents, PDF,
Scanned-Jpeg …
…

Current Case
Information
(CCI)

Case type

Fin_Fraud
Fin_Fraud

Job type

Job
Section

Keyword
search
Keyword
search

Mal_Attack Exe search

Host
OS

Host
File
System

Tool
Name

NTFS

EnCase

7.1

E01

Linux

Ext4

HDD

cmd1

-p -v

…

NTFS

EnCase

7.1

E01

Linux

Ext4

HDD

cmd3

-p -t

…

NTFS

FTK

2.3

Raw

-

-

SSD

cmd2

-t -h

…

Win 10
64b
Win 10
64b
Win 8.1
32b

1
3
2

Image
Image
Tool
Image
Storage
Options/
Source
Source
Cmd
Version format
technology
Parameters
OS
Filesystem

…

Case Profile
Commands (CPC)
Automated digital forensic processing
Exception
Commands (EC)
Case type

Job type

Job
Section

Host
OS

Host
File
System

Tool
Name

Fin_Fraud

Keyword
search_EX

E1

Win 10
64b

NTFS

EnCase

Image
Image
Tool
Image
Storage
Source Source
Version format
technology
OS
Filesystem
7.1

E01

Linux

Ext4

HDD

Rule

Rule1

Options/
…
Parameters
-x -t

…

Figure 3. Automated digital forensic processing module.
word list(s) would differ depending on the
tool specifications and the case profile respectively.
The collection of all jobs that are performed for a particular case type is in public knowledge. Moreover, how a particular
job could be carried out by various digital
forensic software tools could also be documented. There are tool-specific commands
for performing a particular job which could
take specific parameters and options based
on the case type and information from the
CCI document.
All of the above information is captured
in the databases, as shown in Figure 3 that
makes the automation possible. For example, if the job requirement is keyword search
Page 22

for a Financial Fraud case type where a Windows 10 machine with EnCase version 7.1
installed on it is available, and the forensic image is a Hard Disk Drive with Linux
installation needs to be examined, then the
first database entry for keyword search could
fetch the command(s) with corresponding
parameters and options (if applicable). For
simplicity of understanding the authors have
all columns of the databases in Figure 3; otherwise, the databases could be normalized
further.
Even after processing the forensic image
with a variety of digital forensic software
tools, there are some crucial evidence that
might escape the examiner’s scrutiny. For
example, with the surge in mobile phone usc 2019 ADFSL
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age people have started taking pictures of
various documents that they use in their
daily lives. Examples include tickets, different identity cards, business cards, bank
checks, mark-sheets and sometimes username and passwords for important on-line
accounts. The forensic tools that search for
keywords only focus on files that have textual data, and would not be able to search
for images that have some written content
until and unless they are instructed to do
so. Experienced investigators have knowledge of such intricate details, like running
OCR on suspected images along with keyword search, or filtering out the potential
pictures by their metadata in case the OCR
engine fails. These approaches could help
the investigation by obtaining crucial evidence on the first run. The proposed framework stores these intricate details in the ECdatabase. The commands include implementation tricks and techniques that come
from knowledge gathered by forensic experts
over time as well as research breakthroughs.
Structurally the database is similar to CPCdatabase (refer figure 3).
The working of the automation module
(especially the structure of CPC-database)
which is presented above is inspired by
the work of (Karabiyik & Aggarwal, 2014).
However, to the best of authors’ knowledge,
the conceptualization of the Exception Commands database is a fresh contribution.

4.1

Design

An Expert System could be used to design the automation engine. The rules
of conducting forensic analysis could be
stored in the CPC-database. Different variables that need to be considered like case
type, job specification, device type, respective OS and File-System versions, forensic
tool’s name/version, and respective commands/parameters/options could be modeled into the system.
c 2019 ADFSL
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4.2 Relevant vs.
Non-Relevant Files: First
level of data privacy
preservation
The outcome of the automated digital forensic processing would give a list of files from
the forensic image(s) which are potential
pieces of evidence for the case under investigation.
The automation module operations segregate all files present in the forensic image(s) into two classes, namely Forensically Relevant Files (FRF) and Forensically Irrelevant Files (FIF). The FRF
advance to the next stages of the investigation, whereas the FIF is made inaccessible
to the investigator.
The denial of access to all files (including the private files) which are present in
FIF group, is the first level of data privacy preservation ensured by the proposed framework.

5. FORENSIC
RELEVANCE VS. DATA
PRIVACY
The data privacy aims to protect owner’s
personal information from falling into hands
of unauthorized people (Fischer-Hübner,
2001) (OECD, 2002). Whereas, a digital
forensic investigation seeks to find all potential pieces of evidence that indicate a malicious activity carried out in digital space
(Pollitt, 2004).
All files that are selected/ highlighted/ exported at the completion of the automation
module fall into the Forensically Relevant
Files (FRF) group. The number of files in
the FRF is still large enough for the investigators to examine individually. Moreover, a
considerable number of owner’s private files
that do not qualify as concrete evidence are
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also included in the FRF collection. Hence,
finding actual evidence files from the FRF
group is undoubtedly a massive manual effort, which further involves a significant risk
of data privacy violations for the private files
that do not have much of evidential value.
The proposed framework uses machine
learning to determine the degree of relevance
(details in subsection 5.1) as well as the level
of privacy (details in subsection 5.2) for all
files present in the FRF group. The investigator is presented with the top most relevant files (say, a bunch of top 20 or top 50)
for examination, with their respective level
of privacy also marked on them.
The next set of most relevant files is not
presented to the investigator until she examines the first bunch and feels that further
investigation is needed. Only after the investigator raises an explicit request to the system, the next bunch (succeeding 20 or 50) of
files is presented for her scrutiny. The process of request and grant continues until the
investigator finds all actual evidence needed
to resolve the case or the list of FRF gets exhausted. In a rather unusual situation when
the examiner feels that the automation module should be rerun, the framework provides
a provision of doing so too.
The above-stated mechanism, for presenting most relevant files in a bunch until the
investigator finds concrete evidence to prove
or disprove the case, also prevents privacy
breach to an extent. The process could also
be understood as the second level of data
privacy preservation which is ensured by
the proposed framework. Although the data
privacy protection in this filtration process
is not absolute, however, the data privacy of
a large number of files belonging to FRF is
significantly preserved.

5.1

Degree of Relevance

The proposed framework classifies files based
on their degree of relevance to the current
Page 24

case under investigation. The classification
process needs to process data available in
the Evidence Features (EF) database (Figure 4). The EF-database takes information
about each file that is selected into FRF, and
some case specific information from the Current Case Information (CCI) document.
5.1.1

Feature selection

The aim is to classify each file in the FRF
into a potentially-conclusive or a potentiallyindecisive piece of evidence. The information stored in the EF-database corresponding to each file, belonging to the FRF for a
particular case under investigation, acts as a
feature-set for a machine learning implementation. The features can come from:
1. The file’s metadata: includes information like - File-Type; Time-Stamps;
File-Size; File-Address; File Containing
Folder Name; File Containing Folder
Depth; Access Control Permissions; and
Owner(s) of the File.
2. Source image and the automation module: includes information like - Forensic Tool that selected the file; More
than one Tool selected the file (Y/N);
Job-Type; Job-Section; Level of Data
Abstraction; Did the file got extracted from a compound file (Y/N);
Source Image Format; Source Image
File-System; Source Image OperatingSystem; Source Image Storage Technology.
3. Use of the Exception Commands: includes information like - Is a result of
Exception Command (Y/N); Number of
Exception Commands used; Exception
Command IDs.
4. The associated Current Case Information: includes information like - CaseID; Case-type; Has Keywords of Interest (Y/N); Has Name from Suspect
c 2019 ADFSL
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List (Y/N); Is File Type of Interest
(Y/N); Does Fall into Timeline of Interest (Y/N).
It is worthy to note that, the list of abovestated features is not exhaustive and may
contain more features in each category. Also,
the order of features mentioned above does
not reflect their respective significance.
5.1.2

Data collection

The data collection happens when a case is
investigated using the framework. Two options that may be used by the investigating
agencies while doing the data collection are
discussed below:
1. Data collection for a particular type of
case: It includes collecting data while
investigating cases of the same kind.
For example, If an investigative agency
analyzes only Financial Frauds cases,
then all features collected in the Evidence Features database will help in
forming a machine learning prediction
model most suited for financial fraud
cases. Creating a model for a particular kind of case is considerably easy because each case shares a high degree of
commonality in their respective feature
sets.
2. Data collection for all type of cases:
It includes collecting data while investigating cases of all kinds. The features collected in the Evidence Features
database will form a machine learning prediction model that could find
potentially-conclusive evidence for any
given case. Creating a generic model
that can make predictions for any case
at hand is a difficult task as compared
to the previous option because the feature sets will have many variations.
c 2019 ADFSL
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Machine learning approach for
relevance

As already stated before, the machine learning solution aims to classify each file in the
FRF into either a Potentially Conclusive
(PC) or a Potentially Indecisive (PI)
evidence. Hence, to put it formally 1. The machine learning approach addresses a two-class classification problem (a supervised learning technique).
The reason for choosing a supervised
learning approach is to learn from the
experience of the investigators who have
already solved similar cases. The framework needs access to the case related
artifacts like the case information document, the forensic image associated
with that case, information about the
tools that were used to solve the case,
and the list of actual evidence files that
concluded the investigation.
The first three artifacts (mentioned in
the previous paragraph) could be used
by the framework to collect feature
information about all the FRF files,
whereas the last object would act as the
ground truth for training. All actual
evidence that the investigator marks at
the completion of each case investigation help populating the last feature column that is helpful in training.
After training on some examples of
solved cases of the same type, the machine learning solution could start predicting for a new case. However, for
a generalized solution, the training set
should contain a considerable number of
examples of each type of cases that have
been solved by the investigative agency
before the solution could start predicting.
2. The supervised learning approach could
be implemented using an ensemble
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Evidence
Features
Features Sourced
from:
1. File’s metadata
2. From automation
module
3. Exception Commands
4. Current Case
Information (CCI)

Evidence
No.

Relevance
Score

Evidence-33

98

Evidence-52

96

Evidence-40

90

Evidence-16

90

…

…

Figure 4. Degree of relevance for forensically
relevant files.

When a generic solution needs to be
created, an ample number of cases of
each type that the investigation agency
works on is required. However, if multiple agencies agree to share their EFdatabases and list of conclusive evidence
for respective cases, the aim of making
a generic prediction solution could be
achieved.
The machine learning approach finds PC
files and calculates a relevance score for each
of them. The files are then arranged from
highest relevance score to the lowest. The
framework ensures that only a bunch of most
relevant files are presented to the investigator and rest of the files are masked from her.
The investigator asks for the next bunch of
files if required. The process continues till
the investigator finds all conclusive pieces of
evidence or the list of FRF gets exhausted.
The machine learning solution’s efficiency increases with the number of solved cases getting incorporated into the training set.
5.1.4

Mathematical Formulation of
Relevance Score

learning method like Decision tree or
Random Forest that give considerably
good results when the training data set
is less, and the feature set is relatively
strong.

Let the number of input cases be n and the
number of features corresponding to an individual file be x (from the EF-database).

The authors think the above-stated
learning methods are suitable for the
classification task (PC vs. PI) when
developing a prediction model for the
same type of cases with a relatively
small training dataset. However, if an
investigation agency that has a collection of a substantial number of cases
of the same type say hundred or more
cases of financial fraud, then they could
try other algorithms like Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN).

Where, C represent the case vector. The
case instance Ci can be represented as a collection of its respective Forensically Relevant
Files group (FRF).
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C = {C1 , C2 , C3 , ..., Cn }

Ci = {Fi1 , Fi5 , Fi7 , . . . , Fij , . . .}
where, i ∈ (1 to n)
And, Fij is the j th file in Ci ’s FRF. Every
file in the above set can have a maximum of
x features, and the feature vector for Fij can
be represented as:
c 2019 ADFSL
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fFij =

{fij1 , fij2 , fij3 , ..., fijx }
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Since we have x input features, hence the
weight vector W can be represented as


W1
 W2 


 W3 



.
W =


 . 


 . 
Wx

So, the case Ci together with its FRF and
respective feature vectors can be represented
in matrix form as:


  1
fi1 fi12 fi13 fi14 fi15 . fi1x
Fi1
 Fi2   fi21 fi22 fi23 fi24 fi25 . fi2x 


 
 Fi3   fi31 fi32 fi33 fi34 fi35 . fi3x 
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.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ci = 


 
 and,
 .   .
.
.
.
.
.
.


  1
2
3
4
5
x
 Fij   fij fij fij fij fij . fij 
W = f n1 (F eaturesM atrix, EvidenceV ector)
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
The input cases ground-truth evidence can
be represented as


E1
 E2 


 E3 



.
E=


 Ei 


 . 
En
and Ei accounts for the evidence vector corresponding to the ith case which was declared
solved after finding files having conclusive
evidence. For example, the evidence vector
will have a collection of files like
Ei = {Fi1 , Fi3 , Fi5 , . . .}

where, F iles in Ei ⊂ F iles in Ci
Here, the feature vector corresponding to the
evidence Ei would consist of the union of all
prominent features of files mentioned above.
fEi = fFi1 ∪ fFi3 ∪ fFi5 ∪ . . .
Let us assume that the features which get
selected are following
fEi = {fi11 , fi15 , fi39 , fi515 , fi319 , fi521 , . . . , fi1x }
c 2019 ADFSL

The Relevance Score (RS ) for each file
present in FRF can be computed as
RS = f n2 (W eightV ector, F eaturesM atrix)
The computation of RS is followed by sorting of the Potentially Conclusive(PC) files
from the highest relevance score to lower.
The files get clustered into various sets say p
number of sets and each set has m number
of files which can be represented as S = {S1 , S2 , S3 , . . . , Sk , . . . , Sp }, and
Sk = {F1 , F2 , F3 , . . . , Fl , . . . Fm }
The subsection 6.1.5 provides further information about how machine learning algorithms’ scored probabilities can be used for
sorting the PC files.

5.2

Privacy Quotient

The framework also identifies whether a file
is private or it contains any Personally Identifiable Information (PII) about the suspect.
The aim is to correlate the data privacy information for each file with their respective
evidence rating (from the previous subsection). The privacy information of each file
will not restrict the investigative capabilities
of the forensic examiner in any way. However, the privacy quotient of the individual
file would enable both the suspect and the
Page 27

JDFSL V14N2

DF 2.0: An automated, privacy preserving, and efficient DF framework

legal authorities to assess the scale of data
privacy violation, if it happens during the
investigation process.
A specific module named Private and PII
Identification (p2i3) runs on all files belonging to FRF (refer figure 1). The authors have
marked the p2i3-module as a separate entity in the flow diagram; however, the module could be a part of the automation engine
if some of the forensic tools support the required functionality. For example, the tool
EnCase (Version 7 and up) has the provision
of finding files that contain personal information as well as artifacts containing Personally
Identifiable Information.
All files in the FRF group are examined
to determine whether they are private to the
suspect or contain any of her PII.

Privacy
Features
Features Sourced
from:
1. File’s metadata
2. From p2i3 module
3. Current Case
Information

Evidence
No.

Privacy
Category

Evidence-33

PF

Evidence-52

PF

Evidence-40

NPF

Evidence-16

PCF

…

…

Figure 5. Privacy quotient for forensically
relevant files.

Page 28

5.2.1

Feature selection

The information stored in the Privacy Features (PF) database acts a feature-set for
machine learning implementation to find
each file’s privacy quotient. The features are
described below:
1. Features from file’s metadata (same
as in the EF-database): It captures
information like - File-Type; TimeStamps; File-Size; File-Address; File
containing folder name; File containing folder depth; Access-Control permissions; Owner(s) of the file.
2. Features from the source image and
the p2i3 module: It captures information like - Source image format;
Source image File-System; Source image Operating-System; Source image
storage technology; Is the file a private
file (Y/N); Type of the private information identified; More than one type
of private information present (Y/N);
Does the file contain any PII (Y/N);
Type of PII identified; More than one
PII present (Y/N).
3. Features from the CCI document: it
captures information like - Case-ID;
Case-type; Has keywords of interest
(Y/N); Has name(s) from the suspects
list (Y/N); Is the File-Type of interest
(Y/N); Does the file fall into Timeline
of Interest (Y/N).
It may be noted that, the list of abovestated features is not exhaustive and may
contain more features in each category. Also,
the order of the features does not reflect their
respective significance.
The data collection part of the privacy rating solution is same as that of the evidence
rating solution (refer sub-subsection 5.1.2).
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5.2.2

Machine learning approach for
privacy quotient

The aim of the machine learning implementation in the privacy solution is to categorize
files from the FRF group into three groups;
namely, the Private Files (PF), PII Containing Files (PCF), and Non-Private Files
(NPF). Hence, to put it formally -

6. MACHINE
LEARNING
IMPLEMENTATION
The authors present a prototype (proof of
concept) implementation of ML techniques
for predicting the evidential value of a file
(subsection 6.1), as well as assessing the privacy quotient of the file (subsection 6.2).

6.1
1. The machine learning approach addresses a clustering problem. An unsupervised machine learning approach is
used to categorize the files into one of
three clusters (PF, PCF, and NPF ) as
described above.

2. The unsupervised learning approach
can use a k-means algorithm to segregate the files into these three clusters.
However, there are good chances that
the third cluster NPF could get more
than 35% of sample population (files
from FRF), making the k-means cluster analysis unfruitful. In such a situation the solution needs one extra level
of processing.
The k-means algorithm should be
started with a higher value, preferably
3 to 4 times the value of the number
of required clusters “n” (which is currently 3 ). An inflated value of n would
produce 9 to 12 clusters, each of which
would comply with the condition of having the sample population between 5 35%.
A secondary level of clustering on top
of these results (using the Hierarchical
Clustering) will club them into the final three clusters namely, PF, PCF, and
NPF.
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Prediction of evidential
value: Classification

In the absence of a real-world digital forensic case, the authors decided to choose the
‘Hacking-Case’ for the prototype implementation. The Hacking-Case files are available on NIST’s Computer Forensics Reference Data Sets (CFReDS) project website (CFReDS, acc. Mar’18).
6.1.1

The setup

The authors downloaded the EnCase images
(two .E01 files) from the Hacking Case page
on CFReDS website. The rest of the steps
are enumerated below:
1. The authors collected the metadata information about all the files contained
in the forensic image of the given case.
The authors used the EnPack ‘flatfile-export-(v4-0-0).enpack’ (Key, acc.
Mar’18) in EnCase V7 to export around
sixty six columns of metadata information corresponding to each file. The table 1 provides selected fields produced
by the above-mentioned EnPack. The
authors collect all metadata values in
a CSV-file and name it as All-FileDataset (AFD).
2. The authors asked five digital forensic
investigators working in a private digital forensic laboratory to find answers to
20 investigative questions out of the 31
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(listed in Appendix:A), which are mentioned on the website. The authors reduced the number of questions for simplifying the analysis process for the investigators. The authors asked each investigator to mark a set of files as potential evidence. The authors collected
all five sets of marked evidence, where
one investigator’s set may have a slight
difference in the number of entries as
compared to entries in the marked sets
of her colleagues. The above-stated scenario is ideal to collect all potential evidence files for the given case because
the union of all marked sets from multiple investigators would provide a comprehensive list of answers for each investigative question.
3. The authors asked the investigators to
align their tools (EnCase) with the
time-settings of the image before they
start looking for answers. The same
time settings would ensure that marked
files collected from all the investigators
have consistent time values.
4. The investigators were asked to note
down the total time they spent on the
case during the investigation.
5. After the investigation process got
over, the authors asked the investigators to export the metadata information of their respective marked evidence files (using the flat-file-export(v4-0-0).enpack ) into respective Potential Evidence Dataset (PED).
6. The authors first collated all values
generated by the five investigators in
one place and removed the multiple entries. In other words, all PEDs were
merged into one CSV file, and duplicate rows were removed. The authors named this file as All-PotentialPage 30

Evidence-Dataset (APED). The rows
in APED are unique and present the
union of all the files that were marked
by the investigators as potential pieces
of evidence.
7. The authors added a new column to
APED named ‘IsEvidence’; which contained a binary value ‘1’ for all the rows
signaling that all entries in the table
were potential evidence files.
8. At the same time, the authors also
added ‘IsEvidence’ column to the AFD,
and made all entries ‘0’; asserting
that all entries in the AFD were nonevidence files.
9. Finally, the authors merged all entries of
the APED into the AFD, and removed
the duplicate rows where the ‘IsEvidence’ value was ‘0’. The final CSV became the dataset which was used in ML
implementation.
It is worthy to note that some files, marked
by the investigators which were registry values, while exported to their respective PED’s
did not had any of their timestamps (like
Accessed, Acquired, Created, Modified, or
Deleted ) except Written. The authors populated the missing timestamps of these registry entries using the time details of their
parent files in the final dataset.
6.1.2

The dataset

As already mentioned in the previous subsection, the authors have used flat-file-export(v4-0-0).enpack (Key, acc. Mar’18) to export all files present in the Hacking-Case EnCase images. There were a total of 12,190
files present in the case. After exporting the
metadata of all these files using the EnPack,
the authors found that only 11, 937 entries
were populated in the output file (AFD).
The exporting script ignored 98 files which
c 2019 ADFSL
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Table 1. The reduced set of columns present in the dataset.
Type
Time
String

Numeric
Addresses
Alpha-Numeric
Binary

Columns
Accessed, Acquired, Created, Deleted, Modified, Written
Category, Description, EvidenceFile, Extension, Extraction Status,
ItemType, Name, ShortName, PrimaryDevice, Protected, Signature,
SignatureResult, SignatureTag
ExtentCount, FileID, InitializedSize, LogicalSize, PhysicalLocation,
PhysicalSector, PhysicalSize, UniqueOffset
FullPath, Matching File Path, OriginalPath, SymLink
GUID, MD5Hash, SHA1Hash, StartingExtent
HasAttributeList, HasPermList, IsCompressed B, IsDeleted B, IsDisk B, IsDuplicate B, IsEncrypted B, IsFolder B, IsHardLinked B,
IsHidden B, IsIndexed B, IsInternal B, IsMountedVolume B, IsOverwritten B, IsPicture B, IsSparse B, IsStream B, IsVolume B, WasProcessed B, IsEvidence

had a physical size of zero bytes. Moreover,
120 archive/composite files were also skipped
by the script during the process.
The authors intentionally removed one
row from the database, which had the address ‘Dell Latitude CPi\C.’ Encase adds
all images in a case under an imaginary ‘C’
folder, which acts as the root folder for that
case. Since the ‘C’ folder entry does not have
any evidential value or actual existence in
the real case, the authors decided to remove
the same. Hence, the total count of entries
in the AFD database decreases to 11, 972.
The authors then carried out the EnCase
processing on case image and exported the
metadata again. The processing of the image
recovered metadata entries corresponding to
120 archive/composite files that were missed
earlier.
After combining the metadata entries
(PEDs) obtained from the five digital forensic investigators, the authors got a total of
259 metadata entries for all marked potential evidence files in the APED.
c 2019 ADFSL

It may be noted that the forensic investigators also marked registry entries as evidence files, whose metadata information are
not present in the initial forensic image. The
EnCase expands the registry files (like SAM)
and enables the investigator to mark the entries within. There are a total of 23 registry
entries that are included in the APED.
Finally, the authors merged the entries
from the APED into the AFD, and obtained
the final dataset, with a total of 12,115 entries.
The number of columns exported by the
EnPack is 66; however, the authors removed
some of the columns that hold information
specific to EnCase or the EnPack. For example, columns like ‘Codepage’, ‘Complexity’, ‘Entropy’, ‘Tags’, and ‘Recepiant’ are
EnCase specific columns which are not so
tightly related to the actual file. Similarly,
columns like ‘Output filename’ is an example of the EnPack specific column which is
not related to the file.
Moreover, there are some other columns
Page 31

JDFSL V14N2

DF 2.0: An automated, privacy preserving, and efficient DF framework

that hold redundant information; like the
columns ‘Full Path’, ‘Item Path’, and ‘True
Path’ have the same content. The authors
removed such types of columns as well, and
reduced the set of columns to 55 (refer table
1 for details). The 56th column ‘IsEvidence’
is populated by the values received from the
digital forensic examiners. The value ‘1’ in
the column means that the file is potential
evidence in the given case, and a ‘0’ means
it is not.
6.1.3

Experiments and results

The authors conducted experiments on the
dataset using various baseline algorithms,
that include promising Machine Learning
(ML) algorithms suited for two class classification, results of which are presented in
the next section.
Digital forensic investigation process aims
to capture all potential pieces of evidence,
and could not afford to lose any possible evidence that may slip through the investigator’s scrutiny as a benign file. The similar
scenario happens in the ML results, where
the False Negatives (also called Error type 2
in ML) are the files that are actually potential evidence files but have been wrongly predicted as innocuous. Considering the harm
that False Negatives values can have on the
outcome of the investigation, the authors
used the technique of ‘Bagging’ to reduce
their values. Results of the same are presented in the next section.
Experimental protocol: The authors divided the dataset into training and testing
in the proportion of 80% and 20% respectively. Hence the training dataset contains
9,692 records, and the testing dataset includes 2,423 records.
6.1.4

Baseline performance

The authors have used some popular ML algorithms which are known to be good performers on the two-class classification probPage 32

lems. The authors have used seven algorithms, namely - Support Vector Machine (SVM), Two-class Logistic Regression,
Deep SVM, Decision Forest, Decision Jungle, Boosted Decision Tree, and Neural Networks. There is no specific reason for the selection of these seven algorithms, and other
algorithms can also be used on the dataset
to accomplish the required classification job.
The confusion matrix of each of these algorithms is presented in table 2. The positive
labeled entries (marked evidence files) in the
dataset are significantly less than the negative labeled entries (where ‘IsEvidence’ value
is ‘0’), so the accuracy values of the algorithms do not reflect each algorithm’s actual
performance. Hence, the authors have also
incorporated the Equal Error Rate (EER)
of the respective algorithms in the results
(table 2). The lower the EER, the better
the performance. The ROC curves of all
these algorithms are plotted in figure6 for
easy comparison.
The baseline algorithms results show that
all algorithms are not performing good when
it comes to tackling the type 2 errors; the
False Negatives (FN). The high values of
the FN are not right from the digital forensic perspective too, as they allow actual evidence files to slip through the investigator’s scrutiny as innocuous files. However,
the False Positives (FP), called type 1 errors in ML terms, on the other hand, could
also be problematic for digital investigator
as they mark innocent files as potential evidence files. However, since all the files predicted by the proposed ML solution are presented to the investigator for final decision
making, all the FP would be easily identified at that time.
The ML prediction could be meaningful
in digital forensics scenario if the FN are
reduced to a minimum. The authors have
applied ‘Bagging’ technique to achieve the
same goal; which is explained in the subsecc 2019 ADFSL
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Table 2. The baseline performance of various ML algorithms on the dataset.
Algorithm

Confusion
Matrix

Confusion
Matrix Format

Support
Vector
Machine

28
12

2379

FP

TN

Two-Class
Logistic
Regression

36

20

TP

FN

28

TP

2382

FP

TN

7

49

TP

FN

8

2383

FP

TN

Two-Class
Decision
Forest

0

56

TP

FN

0

2392

FP

TN

Two-Class
Decision
Jungle

0

56

TP

FN

0

2392

FP

TN

Two-Class
Neural
Network

44

12

TP

FN

38

2353

FP

TN

Two-Class
Boosted
D-Tree

44

12

TP

FN

5

2386

FP

tion 6.1.6.
6.1.5

Relevance score

As mentioned in the mathematical formulation section 5.1.4, the framework would
present the potential evidence files, sorted
in order of their relevance score, to the investigator. The framework uses the ‘scored
probabilities values’ as the relevance score
for a particular file (the table 3 shows some
examples of the same).
In the table 3, the second column ‘IsEvic 2019 ADFSL

EER

98.37

0.1071

98.81

0.0954

97.67

0.2857

97.75

0.1045

97.75

0.2592

97.96

0.0954

99.31

0.0276

FN

9

Two-Class
LocallyDeep SVM

Accuracy

TN

dence’ is the labeled column which belongs
to the input dataset (AFD). The third column contains the scored values predicted
by the trained ML model (here, the SVM
model ). The fourth column holds the respective probability scores with which the ML
model has predicted the classification.
It can be observed from the table that the
entry 5, is a False Positive (FP); a nonevidential file marked as potential evidence.
Whereas, the entries 7 and 8 are False Negatives (FN); actual evidence files marked as
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Figure 6. The ROC for baseline algorithms.
Table 3. The relevance scores of files.
S. No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

IsEvidence
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1

Scored Labels
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

benign ones. The baseline implementation
results show large numbers of FN, which are
not suitable for the digital forensic investi-
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Scored Probabilities
0.9996124506
0.0007406375
0.0027789336
0.9765605330
0.9028829932
0.0036880332
0.1220335960
0.0965592340

gation. Hence the authors resorted to ‘Bagging’ technique to reduce the same.
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Table 4. The performance of ‘Bagging’ on the dataset.
Number of
Classifiers

15

30

45

60

75

6.1.6

Confusion
Matrix
49

3

TP

FN

203

2168

FP

TN

50

2

TP

FN

197

2174

FP

TN

50

2

TP

FN

233

2138

FP

TN

47

5

TP

FN

198

2173

FP

TN

51

1

TP

FN

318

2053

FP

TN

Bagging

The ML technique ‘Bagging’ solves a given
problem by creating multiple weak ML models that take almost equal portions of positive and negative label samples for training.
Once ready, all these ML models give their
respective predictions for a given test sample. The final decision on that sample is
taken through a majority voting over all of
these predicted values.
The authors took a 40 to 60 ratio of positive to negative labeled samples (selected
with replacement) to train the groups of twoclass classifiers using the Neural Networks
ML algorithm. The authors tried with five
different group sizes, namely 15, 30, 45, 60
and 75; and tested these groups of classifiers
to predict for the current case. The results
of these ‘Bags’ of classifiers are provided in
the table 4. The ROC curves corresponding to bag-level results are presented in the
c 2019 ADFSL

Confusion
Matrix
Format

Accuracy

EER

91.5

0.0599

91.79

0.0627

90.3

0.0585

91.62

0.0606

86.83

0.0611

figure 7.
It can be observed from the confusion matrix of these groups that the False Negatives (FN) have been reduced to low values;
for example, the FN for the ‘75-Classifiers’
group is just 1. Although the accuracy value
for the classifier groups varies, the authors
observed that the ‘45-Classifiers’ group gives
the best performance in terms of a low FN
(2), a low EER (0.0585), and reasonably high
Accuracy (90.3).

6.2

Determining the privacy
quotient: Clustering

After creating a prototype ML model for predicting the evidential relevance of files, the
authors also implemented another ML model
that could cluster files based on their privacy
quotient.
The clustering implementation aims to
segregate all files present in the input digital
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Figure 7. The ROC for the bagging approach.
forensic image into different classes. These
classes can then be labeled as either Private
Files (PF), PII Containing Files (PCF), or
Non-Private Files (NPF).
6.2.1

Dataset

The authors have used the same digital
forensic image as discussed in the section 6.1;
which is the ‘Hacking-Case’, available on the
CFReDS website (CFReDS, acc. Mar’18).
The authors have used the same dataset
for the privacy ML prototype implementation. Since the ‘Hacking Case’ is a generated
case which has been developed by CFReDS
for training purposes, it does not have much
private information that could be clustered
out. Hence, for the sake of simplicity and
Page 36

prototype implementation, the authors has
assumed all media files (pictures and multimedia category) as PF, all documents files
as PCF, and rest of the files as NPF.
6.2.2

Dataset processing

The ML clustering algorithms use higher levels of numerical calculations in the background, before they could assign a clustering label to given entries; hence they prefer
more numeric valued columns in the input
datasets.
The current dataset (introduced in the previous sub-section 6.1.2) has a plentiful of
string-valued columns like ‘Category’, ‘Extention’, ‘Full-Path’, ‘SignatureTags’, and
others. So, in order to get fruitful clusterc 2019 ADFSL
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ing results, the authors carried out datamanipulation and transformation for several non-numeric columns. For example,
the authors changed the string-valued binary
columns (containing ‘TRUE’ or ‘FALSE’
values) into binary-valued columns (‘1’ for
‘TRUE’, and ‘0’ for ‘FALSE’ ). The columns
in the binary category of table 1 with names
like ‘IsDisk B’, ‘IsDuplicate B’, and ‘IsPicture B’ are examples of the same.
For feeding data to clustering algorithms,
the authors dropped some columns from
the input dataset which were not helping
with the clustering process. The insights
about which columns should be dropped,
and which data-manipulation and transformation techniques should be used came from
extensive experimentation.
6.2.3

Experiments and results

JDFSL V14N2

PCF, and NPF files. The authors used a
data transformation on the ‘Category’ column of the dataset, which maps numerical
values (1 to 9) to the string values of the
column. The above-stated mapping is provided in the table 5.
Table 6. The K-Means clustering results.
Purity of cluster
0.677364865
0.999285204
0.553819444
0.487112046
0.461617195
0.321135991
0.993489583
0.682042834
0.707509881

Dominating class
1
4
1
2
2
6
7
1
1

The authors used K-Means and Hierarchal
clustering algorithms for grouping the PF,
Table 5. The data translation of the ‘Category’ column.
Numeric
Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Categories
Library
Windows
Executable
Picture, Multimedia,
Multimedia-Video
Document,
Document-Presentation,
Document-Spreadsheet
None
Folder
Archive
Script, Unknown, Email,
Database, Communication,
Plug In, Internet, Code, Font,
Application

c 2019 ADFSL

For the k-means clustering to work, every
potential cluster should have between 5% to
35% of the sample population respectively.
Since the number of samples in NCF are
more than 35% of total samples, the authors
segregated the NCF into seven sub-groups (7
numeric codes in total). Also, since all media files are in PF, the authors assigned one
numeric code (code-4 ) to them. All the documents files are in PCF are assigned one numeric code (code-5 ). Therefore, the authors
chose nine numeric codes for data translation as mentioned in table 5. The segregation keeps the labeled samples in check and
clustering algorithm is able to perform better.
All the clustering experiments aim to get a
maximum purity value for code-4 and code-5
groups. The ‘purity’ of a particular cluster
with respect to an input class refers to the
probability with which the samples of that
class map into that cluster after clustering.
The higher the purity value, the better is the
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Figure 8. The t-SNE plot for K-Means clustering results.
clustering result for that class.
The results of the k-means algorithm are
shown in table 6. It can be noticed that
the purity of code-4 (PF files) in cluster 2
is ‘0.9992’ (very close to 1 ). However, the
clustering results for code-5 (PCF) are not
so good, as there is not a single output cluster where code-5 dominates the results.
The same results can be visualized in a
better way using the t-SNE plot (a dimensionality reduction method ); which is shown
in the figure 8. Here, the second cluster
which is dominated by code-4 (class-4) can
be seen as a dark patch in the top center of
the plot.
However, when the authors applied hierarchical clustering on the same dataset, the
results were not so encouraging. The hierarPage 38

Table 7. The Hierarchical clustering results.
Purity of cluster
1
1
1
0.923076923
1
1
1
1
0.254199420

Dominating class
9
9
7
9
9
9
9
9
1

chical clustering was not able to clearly distinguish either code-4 (PF) or code-5 (PCF)
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in any of the nine output clusters. The results for hierarchical clustering are stated in
table 7.

7.

SECURE LOGGING
SYSTEM

The logging process ensures that all operations from the starting state in the proposed
framework (refer the flowchart in figure 1)
till the state when the investigation stops
are recorded. The logging also ensures that
all actions of the examiner starting from the
time when she begins the analysis process
till all conclusive evidence get identified are
listed. All system operations and investigator actions need logging because of two
reasons; firstly, to resolve conflicting situations like allegations of data privacy violations; secondly, for studying investigation
styles of examiners for learning and training
purposes.
The logging system could fulfill both of
the above-stated requirements only when the
logs are complete as well as tamper-proof.
The first requirement of completeness, which
is relatively easy to achieve, refers to logging
all activities of the system and the investigator.
However, the second requirement of ensuring that the logs become tamper-proof is
a difficult problem. The first possible solution could capture the activity logs with the
help of a dedicated application running on
the forensic system. This solution assumes
that the examiner is cooperative and honest enough not to interfere with the logging
application. After the investigation process
is complete, the logging application should
transfer the logs to an external storage place
which is safe from tampering. Any tampering attempt during its operation would cause
the application to stop prematurely, invalidating the captured logs.
c 2019 ADFSL
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The second possible solution should try to
capture examiner’s activities at the operating system level (with a system level application or module) and save the logs in a safe location. The safe storage for these logs could
either be a hardened local server or a reliable cloud space where the investigator has
no chance of tampering with them Barik et
al. (2007).
Since the investigator may be required
to explain her actions in case any privacy
breach or some foul play is either doubted
or reported. The secure logging fixes the accountability of the investigator for her actions, in case such a situation arises.

8.

RELATED WORK

A digital forensic process model denotes the
way in which an investigation should proceed
from the time of first response, to an incident
till the investigation is completed. It acts as
a user manual for the investigators, to guide
them on how to collect and analyze potential
evidence from devices.

8.1

Data privacy protection in
Digital Forensics

Although there are plenty of digital forensic
process models discussed in digital forensic
literature, only a few incorporates privacy
of data into the digital forensic investigation
process. There are some excellent papers
that have provided solutions to the data privacy protection problem in the digital forensic scenario. However, their solutions are either designed for a specific environment and
not generic in nature; or the privacy protection works as a separate module that has
performance implications.
Staden (2013) proposes a framework that
protects the privacy of third party during a
digital forensic investigation with the help of
a profiling and filtering mechanism. Depending on the sensitivity of data being queried,
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a decision is taken whether the data should
be presented to the examiner or not. The
paper focuses on enhancing the privacy in
multi user environments,that are subjected
to post incident investigations.
Dehghantanha and Franke (2014) have
defined the same as a cross-disciplinary
field of research and named it as ‘privacyrespecting digital investigation’. They also
talk about the present challenges and opportunities that the field has to offer.
Aminnezhad et al. (2012) state that digital forensic investigators face a dilemma
whether they should protect suspects’ data
privacy or achieve completeness in their investigation. The paper also states that there
is a lack of awareness among professional digital forensic investigators regarding suspects’
data privacy, which could result in an unintentional abuse. There have been attempts
to protect data privacy during digital forensic investigation using cryptographic mechanisms. Law et al. (2011) have proposed a
way to protect the data privacy using encryption. The authors talk of encrypting
data set on an email server and indexing
the case related keywords, both at the same
time. The investigator gives keyword input
to the server owner, who has the encryption
keys, to get back the emails that contain the
keyword.
Hou, Uehara, Yiu, Hui, and Chow
(2011b) propose a mechanism to protect
the privacy of data on third party service
provider’s storage center form the investigator using homomorphic and commutative encryption. At the same time, the mechanism
also ensures that the service provider does
not get to know the queries that were fired
by the investigator. Hou, Uehara, Yiu, Hui,
and Chow (2011a) talk of a similar solution
on a remote server.
Shebaro and Crandall (2011) use Identity Based Encryption to carry out a network
traffic data investigation in privacy preservPage 40

ing setting. Guo, Jin, and Huang (2011) put
forward generic privacy policies for network
forensic investigations.
Croft and Olivier (2010) have proposed a
mechanism where data is compartmentalized
into layers of sensitivity, less private data
on lower layers and highly private data on
higher layers. Investigator’s access to private
information is controlled by initially restricting his access to the lower layers first. The
investigator is required to prove his knowledge of the low-level layers, to get access to
higher level information.
The Df 2.0 framework ensures that the
data privacy protection is incorporated into
the digital forensic model and hence does not
have any impact on the efficiency of the investigation process.

8.2

Next generation of digital
forensics

The subsection discusses some notable research works that proposed the next level of
digital forensics. They either incorporated
high levels of hardware performance or advocated the use of automation as a performance enhancement measure; or both.
Ayers (2009) enlists the limitation of the
first generation of digital forensic tools that
are struggling with the huge volumes of data
involved in modern day investigations. The
author proposes several parameters to measure efficiency, together with the requirements that need to be incorporated into the
second generation of digital forensic tools.
The author also proposed processing architecture of second generation tools which utilizes Beowulf clusters, supercomputers, distributed systems, and grid computing. The
evidence storage, workflow management and
software reliability of the second generation
tools are also discussed. The paper provides
requirements and high-level characteristics
of the system that was under development.
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Garfinkel (2010) also talks about the
requirement for data standardization and
modular mechanisms in the field for digital
forensics and digital forensic research.
Van Baar et al. (2014) have brilliantly
moved the digital forensic processing on a
cloud where high-end machines could speed
up processing and help different actors involved in a digital forensic investigation to
collaborate on a particular case.
Carrier, Spafford, et al. (2005) proposed
a way to automate searches in digital forensic investigations. Richard III and Roussev
(2006) suggested a way to handle large-scale
digital investigations with the use of distributed computing. They proposed the use
of a cluster of distributed computers to facilitate processing and store the images and
results at a central data store. The authors
suggested the use of automation by all forensic tools so that they may handle the challenges of tomorrow.
Abbott, Bell, Clark, De Vel, and Mohay
(2006) proposed an automated way to correlate events for digital forensic investigation.
The authors also demonstrate implementation using publically available digital forensic scenarios and data.

9.

CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK

The authors have proposed a new digital
forensic framework that brings efficiency in
digital forensic processing with the help of
automation while preserving data privacy for
the suspect. The framework ensures that
the automation supports a range of digital forensic software tools and produces effective outcomes by incorporating the current case information, case profile data, the
knowledge of experienced digital forensic investigators. The investigator is presented
with the most relevant evidence that are
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sorted with the help of machine learning algorithms. The framework balances the investigative requirements of the case with the
data privacy protection of suspect’s forensically irrelevant private files. The framework ensures that the efficiency of investigation is enhanced, without compromising on
the outcomes of the investigation or affecting the investigative powers of the examiner.
However, since the system is securely logging all actions of the investigator, she experiences a greater sense of accountability for
avoiding unwanted data privacy violations.
The automation and secure logging encourage a better validation check, hence bringing
a higher level of transparency into the investigation process.
The current work also exhibits a prototype ML implementation that predicts the
evidential relevance of a given file that is
present in the forensic image of a case under investigation. The algorithm predicts
whether a given file is potential evidence or
not. The prediction task has been modeled
as a supervised learning problem (two-class
classification) where the ML algorithm aims
first to get training on a labeled dataset, followed by making predictions on the records
of the testing dataset. Firstly, the performance of seven baseline ML algorithms
was tested on the CFReDS’s ‘Hacking Case’
dataset ((CFReDS, acc. Mar’18)). In spite
of giving a reasonable accuracy the results
from these seven algorithms show a high
rate of False Negatives, which is not acceptable in the digital forensic investigative scenario. So, the authors used the ‘Bagging’
technique, that takes the predictive decision
by taking a majority voting over the predictions of a bunch of weak machine learning
models that are trained on small portions of
nearly equal parts of positive and negative
labeled samples from the dataset. The use of
bagging significantly reduced the number of
False Negatives, making the ML predictions
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more usable for a digital forensic investigator. The implementation of ML techniques
for assessing the privacy quotient showed encouraging results. The k-means algorithm
implementation produced an exclusive output cluster that was dominated by the PF
class. However, the results for the PCF class
were not so promising.

9.1

Future work

The authors would like to deploy the ML solution in real life digital forensic cases. It
would require the authors to have access
to these real-life forensic images, which are
available in various digital forensic laboratories. Since sharing the data may be difficult
for the agencies who possess the forensic images of such cases. So, the authors would
like to make an independent standalone system that could be used by the digital forensic
personnel working in a laboratory environment to extract the datasets from the cases
they have in their possession and build ML
trained models on them.
As the dataset holds only the metadata
information of the files contained in the digital forensic image; it would be easy for the
forensic personnel to share their respective
datasets and the ML trained models with
the research community as well as their colleagues in other digital forensic laboratories.
In the long term, the authors would like to
combine the ML models trained on cases
from different laboratories in one geographical region with the models from neighboring
laboratories (state-level or country-level ) to
find how the prediction pattern varies; and
how these learnings could be used in making
a universal prediction system. Another exciting extension could be applying the prediction models trained on data in one language to predict cases containing different
languages.
Since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has come into force from May
Page 42

2018; the authors would also like to incorporate all privacy compliance measures into the
DF 2.0.
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APPENDIX
A: The Hacking Case Questionnaire
1. What operating system was used on the computer?
2. When was the install date?
3. What is the time-zone settings?
4. Who is the registered owner?
5. What is the computer account name?
6. What is the primary domain name?
7. When was the last recorded computer shutdown date/time?
8. How many accounts are recorded (total number)?
9. What is the account name of the user who mostly uses the computer?
10. Who was the last user to logon to the computer?
11. A search for the name of “Greg Schardt” reveals multiple hits. One of these proves that
Greg Schardt is Mr. Evil and is also the administrator of this computer. What file is
it? What software program does this file relate to?
12. List the network cards used by this computer. This same file reports the IP address
and MAC address of the computer. What are they?
13. Find some ‘installed programs’ that may be used for hacking.
14. What is the SMTP email address for Mr. Evil?
15. List some newsgroups that Mr. Evil has subscribed to?
16. A popular IRC (Internet Relay Chat) program called MIRC was installed. What are
the user settings that was shown when the user was on-line and in a chat channel?
17. This IRC program has the capability to log chat sessions. List some IRC channels that
the user of this computer accessed.
18. Ethereal, a popular “sniffing” program that can be used to intercept wired and wireless
Internet packets was also found to be installed. When TCP packets are collected and
re-assembled, the default save directory is that users ‘My Documents’ directory. What
is the name of the file that contains the intercepted data?
19. Viewing the file in a text format reveals much information about who and what was
intercepted. What type of wireless computer was the victim (person who had his Internet
surfing recorded) using?
20. How many files are actually reported to be deleted by the file system?
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